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Abstract 
The task of this paper is to trace the academic discourse on CSR by discussing how 
CSR approaches and models relate profit goals and social goals of the corporation. I 
show that CSR approaches that dominate the academic discourse either 
instrumentalize the social, idealize the corporate or separate the corporate from 
the social. Based on a critical political economy perspective I argue that it is 
necessary to consider mutual interrelations between profit goals and social goals. 
This perspective reveals an antagonism between the corporate and the social that 
points at the impossibility of CSR. Critical CSR research thus far has failed to draw 
the necessary conclusions from its own analysis: despite acknowledging the 
structural flaws of the concept of CSR, critics have hardly made any attempts to 
overcome it. I argue that despite its ideological character CSR contains a rational 
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element. Realising this rational kernel however requires going beyond CSR. I 
therefore suggest a new concept that turns CSR off its head and places it upon its 
feet.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Traditionally there exist two competing assumptions about how the common good 
can be achieved through and within capitalism: One is based on the principle of 
laissez faire and a belief in the self-regulating capacity of the market, while the 
second stresses the need for government regulation. The former hypothesis dates back to Adam Smithǯs description of an ǲinvisible handǳ that leads self-interested 
individuals without knowing it to promote the public interest (Smith 1759/1976, 
185; 1776/1976, 456). The latter assumption has one of its origins in the work of John Maynard Keynes, who pointed at the ǲinadequacy of the theoretical 
foundations of the laissez-faire doctrineǳ ȋKeynes ͳͻ͵͸/ͳͻ͸͹, ͵͵ͻȌ and argued 
that it is in the public interest if governments deliberately intervene into certain 
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domains of the economy. Both approaches have found ardent supporters and 
influence economic theorizing until today. While advocates of the first view argue 
that individual self-interested behaviour creates socially desirable outcomes, 
supporters of the second view counter that macro-economic policies are necessary 
to ensure that capitalist economic operations lead to general social well-being. 
Both approaches however were originally based on the assumption that the 
primary goal of corporations is profit maximization.  
The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) cuts across both approaches 
by positing that corporations, i.e. individual economic actors, have the 
responsibility to take the social consequences of their behaviour into account. On 
the one hand demanding that corporations should act socially responsible implies 
doubts regarding the actual self-regulating capacity of the market. On the other 
hand arguing that corporations are socially responsible actors implies that 
government control of corporations has become obsolete. CSR thus challenges 
traditional assumptions regarding the role of the corporation and the state. It 
raises new questions about the relation between the corporate and the social.  
By focussing on this relation this paper critically questions the assumption that 
CSR can lead to a more socially just, equitable and thus responsible economy. I 
show why despite CSR, tensions between corporate and social goals remain 
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irreconcilable and argue that in order to realise CSRǯs promise we need to go 
beyond CSR.  
In the following I first systematically discuss possible ways of relating economic 
and social goals of the corporation (section 2).  Based on a critical political 
economy perspective I argue that the relationship between profit goals and social 
goals is antagonistic and CSR therefore impossible. I suggest an alternative concept 
that turns CSR off its head and places it upon its feet (section 3) and conclude with 
some remarks about how to promote its implementation (see section 4).  
 
2. A Typology of Approaches to Corporate Social Responsibility 
The question how economic and social goals of the corporation are related has 
during the last years been an important topic within CSR research.  A vast amount 
of empirical studies have investigated how acting socially responsible and 
maximizing profits affect each other (for a review see Margolis and Walsh 2003; 
Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes 2003). Questions that are addressed in these studies include: ǲDoes social performance influence financial performance; does financial 
performance influence social performance; or, is there a synergistic relationship ȋeither positive or negativeȌ between the two?ǳ ȋPreston and OǯBannon ͳͻͻ͹, ͶͳͻȌ. 
The relation between the corporate and the social is however not only an empirical 
question, but also lies at the heart of CSR theory. It is surprising that attempts to 
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map the academic discourse on CSR (see for example Preston 1975, Sohn 1982, 
Garriga and Melé 2004, Windsor 2006, Secchi 2007) never focussed on this 
relation. Within the discourse on CSR diverging viewpoints exist regarding the 
question how the new goal of acting socially responsible relates to the traditional 
corporate goal of maximizing profits.  
A systematic description of different views of how to align the corporate and the 
social can be based on a typology of four ways of thinking, introduced by the 
Austrian philosopher of information Wolfgang Hofkirchner. He distinguishes four 
possible ways of relating two phenomena with different degrees of differentiation: 
Reductionism, projectionism, dualism and dialectics (Hofkirchner, 2003, 133): 
Reductionism reduces the higher differentiated phenomenon to the lower 
differentiated one. Projectionism in contrast projects the higher degree of 
differentiation on the lower differentiated side. Dualism separates both 
phenomena from each other and does not recognise any interrelations. Dialectical 
thinking on the contrary considers how both sides mutually shape each other1. 
                                                        
1 In regard to profit goals and social goals of the corporation, the former can be considered as the 
lower and the latter as the higher differentiated phenomenon: Profit is a goal of a single 
corporation within the economic sub-system of society. Caring for social issues on the contrary 
means contributing to the functioning of society as a whole and not just to the success of one of its 
parts. Doing social good and contributing to the well-being of society can thus be described as a 
more complex and higher differentiated goal than generating profit and contributing to the well-
being of the corporation.  
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Reductionist approaches to CSR thus reduce the engagement in social activities to 
a means for advancing profit goals (see section 2.1). Projectionism on the contrary 
projects ethical principles or social consciousness onto corporate profit goals (see 
section 2.2). Dualism treats economic and social goals of the corporation as 
disjunctive and argues that companies should simultaneously achieve both, being 
economically successful and acting socially responsible (see section 2.3). A 
dialectical perspective describes the relation between the corporate and the social 
as inherently conflictual (see section 2.4).  
Table 1 summarizes reductionist, projectionist, dualist and dialectical approaches 
to CSR. 
Reductionism 
  
Reduces social responsibilities to profit goals: 
Social problems as profitable business opportunities  
 
Projectionism  
 
 
Projects social responsibilities onto profit goals:  
Responsible profit generation 
 
Dualism 
 
 
Separates profit goals and social responsibilities from each 
other: 
Generating profit and acting socially responsible 
 
Dialectics 
 
 
Describes profit goals and social responsibilities as 
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Table 1: Ways of thinking about CSR 
 
2.1. Reductionism – Instrumentalizing the social 
A first possible way of theorizing the relation between the corporate and the social 
is to reduce CSR to a means for advancing corporate profit goals. Such approaches 
stress that CSR is beneficial for businesses through opening up new markets, 
preventing government regulation, attracting employees, or improving 
relationships with stakeholders and creating public trust in the corporation. 
Advocates of a reductionist approach do not question the assumption that the 
purpose of a corporation is to make as much profit as possible. However they 
argue that maximizing profit does not contradict engaging in CSR activities – as 
long as social issues are addressed in a profitable way. The goal of reductionist CSR 
approaches thus is to find ways of capitalizing on CSR activities.  
One way in which CSR is perceived as beneficial for business goals is through 
preventing government regulation. Almeder (1980) for example argues that for 
reaching business goals refraining from dealing with social issues is 
counterproductive. Quite on the contrary, companies would have to make sure that 
they behave in a way that renders government intervention obsolete (Almeder 
contradictory: 
Structural irresponsibility of profit generation 
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ͳͻͺͲ, ͳ͵Ȍ. Almeder therefore radically criticises what he calls ǲFriedman doctrineǲ and emphasizes that it ǲwill most likely undermine capitalism and motivate an 
economic socialism by assuring an erosive regulatory climate in a society that 
expects the business community to be socially responsible in ways that go beyond just making legal profitsǲ ȋAlmeder ͳͻͺͲ, ͳ͵Ȍ.  
Other representatives of a reductionist approach further exaggerate this argument. 
They highlight that engaging in CSR activities is not only helpful for preventing 
further regulation but for fostering deregulation and privatization. According to this view social problems should be regarded as ǲbusiness opportunitiesǳ and thus 
as potential spheres for capital accumulation. Peter Drucker (1984) for example argues that the social problems of the future ǲcan be solved only if seen and treated as opportunities. And the economic realities ahead are such that Ǯsocial needsǯ can be financed increasingly only if their solution generates capital, i.e. generates a profitǳ ȋDrucker ͳͻͺͶ, ͷͷȌ. The task would be to privatize domains of 
social needs, with which governments can, according to Drucker, not deal 
adequately. He suggests that governments should make sure to identify social 
problems and provide the financial resources for dealing with them, while the 
actual task is performed by businesses on a competitive basis (Drucker 1984, 58).  
This means that companies should deal with social issues and the necessary 
money should be provided by the public. This in fact means that government is 
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funding private initiatives that primarily aim at maximizing profits. Public money 
is thus turned into private profit.  
Similar to Drucker also Davis stresses that dealing with social issues can be beneficial for a companyǯs primary task of generating profit. (e for example 
highlights that social problems such as high prices for HIV/AIDS drugs in 
developing countries or increasing obesity due to unhealthy food and the 
environmental devastation have created profit opportunities through generic 
drugs, health meals and cleaner fuels (Davis 2005, 107).  
Cogman and Oppenheim (2002) have advanced a similar reductionist approach to 
CSR that regards social issues as potentially profitable spheres of investment: ǲmany of todayǯs most exiting opportunities lie in controversial areas such as gene 
therapy, the private provision of pensions, and products and services targeted at 
low-income consumers in poor countriesǳ ȋCogman and Oppenheim ʹͲͲʹ, ͷ͹Ȍ.  
The described reductionist understandings of CSR recommend dealing with social 
issues not because they consider it as a moral obligation or social necessity, but 
because they regard them as potential areas for profit accumulation. Instead of 
incorporating aspects of social well-being into business operations, this 
perspective argues for extending the logic of business to all further domains of 
social life such as education, health care, the pension system, etc. Within the 
framework of the welfare state, these domains of social welfare were, due to their 
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fundamental importance for social security and inclusion, consciously protected 
from the competitive logic of the market. The logic of the market always means 
that on the one hand profit is generated through the appropriation of surplus value 
and on the other hand that access to products and services is restricted to those 
who have enough money to afford them and thus is inherently exclusive. 
Privatization, which means the extension of the market logic on areas that were 
until then regulated though other mechanisms, thus means an extension of the 
already existing unequal access to means of economic, social and cultural life. 
Privatizing in the domain of education and health care thus means that basic social 
welfare is not guaranteed to every member of society, but only to those who can 
afford it. In the case of health care, exclusion can literally be a matter of life and 
death. A private health care system that works according to market principles is a 
system in which winning means profit and loosing can mean death. The idea of 
solving social problems by imposing on them the competitive logic of markets thus 
seems paradoxical and cynical.  
Other arguments why engaging in CSR activities is in the self-interest of 
corporations are related to creating competitive advantages through establishing 
stakeholder trust and good corporate reputation. One example is Thomas M. Jones ȋͳͻͻͷȌ ǲinstrumental theory of stakeholder managementǳ. (e argues that taking 
into account social issues from a business perspective at the first sight might seem 
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irrational, but in the long run lies in the self-interest of a company as it is ǲquite compatible with economic successǳ ȋJones ͳͻͻͷ, ͶʹͻȌ.  )n this context Falck and (eblich ȋʹͲͲ͹Ȍ point out that ǲcompanies have an opportunity to do well by doing goodǳ ȋFalck and (eblich ʹͲͲ͹, ʹͷʹȌ. Burke and 
Logsdon (1996) term such an approach strategic corporate social responsibility (S-
CSR) as it focuses on ǲsubstantial business-related benefits to the firm, in particular by supporting core business activities and thus contributing to the firmǯs effectiveness in accomplishing its missionǳ ȋBurke and Logsdon ͳͻͻ͸, Ͷͻ͸Ȍ. 
Following such a strategic orientation, many CSR consulting books for mangers are 
based on reductionist arguments. The consulting literature includes titles such as ǲWhen principles pay: Corporate social responsibility and the bottom lineǳ ȋ(eal ʹͲͲͺȌ; ǲJust good business: The strategic guide to aligning corporate social responsibility and brandǳ ȋMcElhaney ʹͲͲͺȌ; ǲCSR strategies: Corporate social responsibility for a competitive edge in emerging marketsǳ ȋUrip ʹͲͳͲȌ; ǲThe ()P investor: Make bigger profits by building a better worldǳ ȋ(erman ʹͲͳͲȌ; ǲGreen 
to gold: How smart companies use environmental strategy to innovate, create value, and build competitive advantageǳ ȋEsty and Winston ʹͲͲͻȌ; ǲStirring it up: (ow to make money and save the worldǳ ȋ(irshberg ʹͲͲͺȌ. These titles try to 
establish a connection between profit and CSR that creates the impression of 
maximizing the former by means of the latter: These titles promise to achieve 
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ǲbigger profits by building a better worldǳ, explain how to use ǲCorporate social 
responsibility for a competitive edgeǳ of how ǲsmart companiesǳ should ǲuse environmental strategyǳ for creating a competitive advantage. A common motif for 
the instrumental view of social responsibility is also incorporated in the ambiguous meaning of the phrase ǲgood businessǳ, which contains the idea of the 
good as the profitable business.  Furthermore, the fact that books that supposedly 
are about social responsibility, in their titles all use buzzwords for economic success and profit, such as ǲbottom lineǳ, ǲcompetitive edgeǳ, ǲcompetitive advantageǳ, ǲbigger profitsǳ, ǲmake moneyǳ, highlights their instrumental 
approach. 
Based on this logic it is most likely that companies, which follow an instrumental 
reductionist approach will drop the idea of CSR as soon as cost outweigh benefits, 
that is as soon as CSR can only be pursued at the expensive of profit. Thus, this way 
of thinking about CSR might successfully contribute to sustainable economic 
growth, but not to achieving a sustainable society. 
For reductionists, CSR is not an end in itself but a means for maximizing profit. CSR 
is thus conceived as a mere instrument, the use of which is subject to strategic 
considerations under the primacy of the bottom line. It thus incorporates what Max (orkheimer ȋͳͻͶ͹/ʹͲͲͶȌ called ǲinstrumental reasonǳ as the reduction of reason from a means for defining ends, to the ǲmere regulation of the relation 
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between means and endsǳ ȋ(orkheimer ͳͻͶ͹/ʹͲͲͶ, ͹Ȍ, to an ǳexecutive agency concerned with the how rather than with the whatǲ ȋ(orkheimer ͳͻͶ͹/ʹͲͲͶ, 38). 
In a similar way, reductionist CSR does not engage in a discussion whether ethical 
and socially responsible behaviour is desirable, it just uses it as an instrument for achieving a given end: profit. The idea of social responsibility is degraded to ǲa tool, for it derives its meaning only through its connection with other endsǲ 
(Horkheimer 1947/2004, 25). 
The reductionist approach feeds on the ideological argument that markets are 
more effective than governments and that their unregulated operation guarantees 
best possible outcomes not only for business, but for society as a whole. The 
reductionist version of CSR serves as an ideological underpinning for the 
neoliberal desire for the expansion of markets and the search for new spheres of 
profit accumulation. The reductionist view of CSR thus perverts the idea of social 
responsibility. Instead of increasing social justice it reinforces inequality and 
injustice. 
 
2.2. Projectionism – Idealizing the corporate 
Another way of thinking about CSR is to regard the corporation as an organization 
that should contribute to the common good. This projectionist view is based on the 
assumption that profit can be generated in a socially responsible way. 
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Representatives of this approach do not question the profit motive, but want to 
tame it through imposing on it certain values and a concern for society and the 
environment. Corporations should act and generate profit in a way that is 
beneficial for society in general and not just for the interests of its shareholders. 
Such an orientation characterizes early accounts of CSR. Howard Bowen, whom Carroll called ǲthe Father of Corporate Responsibilityǳ ȋCarroll ͳͻͻͻ, ʹ͹ͲȌ, argued 
that the decisions taken by businessmen have far-reaching consequences and that 
they therefore are obligated to consider social issues and responsibilities (Bowen ͳͻͷ͵Ȍ. (e defined the social responsibility of the businessman as follows: ǲ)t refers 
to the obligations of businessman to pursue those policies, to make those 
decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our societyǳ ȋBowen ͳͻͷ͵, ͸Ȍ.  Other early theorists of CSR followed Bowenǯs approach. Frederick ȋͳͻ͸Ͳ, ͸ͲȌ stressed that businessmen should ensure that their activities meet ǲthe 
expectations of the publicǲ; Davis and Bloomstrom (1966, 12) argued that companies have obligations towards ǲthe whole social systemǲ, Keith Davis ȋͳͻ͸͹, 
46) highlighted that social responsibility means considering the affects of business activities on ǲthe whole social systemǳ ȋDavis K. ͳͻ͸͹, Ͷ͸Ȍ, and Carroll (1979) pointed out that ǲThe social responsibility of business encompasses the economic, 
legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at a 
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given point of timeǳ ȋCarroll 1979, 500). Caroll describes a pyramid of corporate 
social responsibility, which starts with economic responsibilities, followed by legal 
responsibilities, ethical responsibilities, and the responsibility to be a good 
corporate citizen (philanthropic responsibility) (Carroll 1991, 8). He argues that 
the intention of this pyramid is to show that ǲthe total CSR of business comprises distinct components that, taken together, constitute the wholeǲ ȋCarroll ͳͻͻͳ, ͺȌ. Carrollǯs approach to CSR can be described as projectionist as they subsume profit generation under the ǲunified wholeǳ of social responsibility.  Another example for a projectionist approach is Edward Freemanǯs stakeholder approach ȋͳͻͺͶȌ and in particular his idea of a ǲstakeholder capitalismǳ ȋFreeman 
and Phillips 2002). It proposes a transformation of capitalism towards the equal 
recognition of all stakeholders (Freeman 1994, Freeman and Phillips 2002). 
Freeman and Phillips (2002) stress that the model of stakeholder capitalism is about ǲthe possibility that business becomes a fully human institutionǳ that creates ǲvalue for all stakeholdersǳ ȋFreeman and Phillips ʹͲͲʹ, ͵ͶͷȌ. This equal 
recognition of all stakeholders would abolish the separation between business and 
ethics  (1994, 1999, Freeman and Phillips 2002). The model of stakeholder capitalism embraces this idea of blending together business and ethics: ǲwe can 
reorient capitalism toward an ethics of freedom and responsibility - one that inherently marries business and ethicsǳ ȋFreeman and Phillips 2002, 345). 
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Freeman highlights that every management decision and operation at the same 
time has business-related and ethical implications. The idea of turning business into ǲa fully human institutionǳ and of abolishing the distinction between business and ethics is similar to Carrollǯs approach of subsuming financial goals under the 
concept of social responsibilities. Both approaches are projectionist as they impose 
ethics and social responsibility on the corporate profit goals.  
One important characteristic of Freemans version of stakeholder theory is the principle of voluntarism: ǲVoluntarism means that an organization must on its own 
will undertake to satisfy its key stakeholders. A situation where a solution to a 
stakeholder problem is imposed by a government agency or the courts must be seen as a managerial failureǲ ȋFreeman ͳͻͺͶ, ͹ͶȌ. Freemanǯs stakeholder model 
aims at overcoming the separation between business and ethics and at achieving a 
more responsible capitalism, by suggesting to managers to voluntarily integrate 
the demands of all stakeholder into their decisions.  While Freeman advocates 
pure voluntarism, other representatives of a projectionist approach stress that 
imposing ethics and social compatibleness on profit generation requires going 
beyond purely voluntary initiatives. Epstein (1987, 2007) for example argues that 
voluntary self-regulation is insufficient. He emphasizes that additional instruments 
are needed such as law, affinity group regulation, ethical precepts, vigilant and responsible media and civil society. Epstein notes that for achieving a ǲbetter 
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capitalismǳ it is indispensable to have both, responsible companies and effective 
laws (Epstein 2007, 222).  
Similarly McInerney stresses that voluntary CSR is insufficient and that 
government regulation is necessary (McInerney 2007, 172). He argues that fiscal policy ǲwith its ability directly to effect corporate profits, can potentially be much 
more powerful than CSR, which depends on reputational damage, and any 
subsequent indirect effects on corporate profits, as its incentive mechanismǳ 
(McInerney 2007, 190). 
In this context Andreas Georg Scherer and Guido Palazzo (2007) advocate a shift 
towards a more political approach to CSR (Scherer and Palazzo 2007, 1111). Based 
on Habermasǯ concept of ǲdeliberative democracyǳ they propose that rather than demanding an alternative to capitalism, the aim should be to ǳȋreȌestablish a 
political order where economic rationality is circumscribed by democratic institutions and proceduresǳ ȋScherer and Palazzo 2007, 1097). The projectionist 
orientation of this approach is illustrated by the fact that it does not dismiss the 
profit principle as such but wants to subordinate it under the common good. 
Scherer and Palazzo aim at developing a normative approach to CSR that is based 
on a political analysis instead of philosophical principles (Scherer and Palazzo 
2007, 1098). In their view this requires to exert democratic control over corporate 
decisions (Scherer and Palazzo 2007, 1109). Measures they suggests for 
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implementing this deliberate concept of CSR include: ǲdeveloping corporate codes 
of behaviour in collaboration with critical NGOs, exposing corporate CSR 
performance to third party control, linking corporate decision making to civil 
society discourses, and shifting corporate attention and money to societal challenges beyond immediate stakeholder pressureǳ ȋScherer and Palazzo ʹͲͲ͹, 
1115). 
Representatives of a projectionist approach put forward the idea that corporate 
social responsibility is a means for reforming capitalism and reducing its negative 
social and environmental effects. While some argue that this can be achieved based 
on voluntary corporate initiatives (Freeman), others argue for stronger public 
control over corporations (Epstein, Scherer and Palazzo).  
Projectionism assumes that it is possible to tame the profit motive by imposing 
ethical norms or social pressure on it. It points at the importance of pursuing non-
profit goals but fails to problematise their relation to profit interests. Thus it 
overlooks existing power structures and problems that result from profit 
generation as such: It overlooks injustices that arise from the fact that capitalism is 
always based on the separation of individuals in owners and non-owner of means 
of production; that every profit rests on exploitation in the form of appropriating 
surplus value produced by workers; that as a competitive system capitalism 
necessarily has to produce winners and losers; that capitalism always has to follow 
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an expansive logic because for its preservation capital has to be constantly 
accumulated and thus capitalism has to expand, to strive for growth and to 
permanently find new spheres of accumulation; that those who are not willing to 
follow the capitalist logic are most likely to lose in the competition and thus will be 
excluded, etc. 
Projectionist approaches to CSR see a necessity to reform capitalism. They aim at establishing a more ǲjustǳ, ǲsustainableǳ or ǲbetterǳ capitalism through the help of 
business ethics and CSR. Such approaches challenge the growth based and profit 
maximizing logic of capitalism without questioning private property and capital 
accumulation. The desired changes in the way the economy operates are thus 
always constrained by the framework of capitalism. This means that projectionists 
want to reform capitalism, but not transcend it.  
According to this view it is possible to resolve the relation between profit and 
social responsibility through making profit socially responsible by subjecting it to 
public expectations (Bowen, Davis, Frederick, Carroll), a concern for society as a 
whole (Davis K. and Blomstrom), ethical consideration (Freeman), ethics and law 
(Epstein), or democratic control (Scherer and Palazzo). Following this perspective 
companies should equally respect the needs and interests of all stakeholders 
ranking from shareholders to employees to local communities to society in 
general. However different stakeholders are likely to have opposing interests. Thus 
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when deciding about corporate strategies, conflicts between different stakeholder 
groups are likely. Within the framework of a corporation decision power is not 
equally distributed among the various stakeholders. Owners of a corporation have 
much more power than for example local communities and are thus more likely to 
influence corporate decision in way that satisfies their interests. The projectionist 
idea of realizing equal respect for a stakeholder interests and stakeholder 
democracy within questioning the framework of a privately owned cooperation is 
idealistic because it ignores actual existing power structures.  
In particular, arguments for voluntary CSR fail to take into account material 
foundations of capitalist social relations and their effects and thus run the risk of 
reducing problems of capitalism to a lack of morality and social responsibility.  The 
idea that problems of capitalism can be resolved by introducing business ethics 
and CSR overlooks and mystifies the structural immorality of the capitalist system. 
Representatives of a projectionist approach that argue for a voluntary CSR 
contribute to a moralizing ideology, which has been a central argument in the context of the ʹͲͲͺ financial crisis.  Žižek ȋʹͲͲͻȌ highlights the ideological 
dimension of this moralizing argument: ǲOver the last several months, public 
figures from the pope downwards have bombarded us with injunctions to fight 
against the culture of excessive greed and consumption. This disgusting spectacle 
of cheap moralization is an ideological operation if there ever was one: the 
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compulsion (to expand) inscribed into a system itself is translated into a matter of personal sin, a private psychological propensityǲ ȋŽižek ʹͲͲͻ, ͵͹Ȍ. 
 
2.3 Dualism – Separating the corporate and the social 
Dualist CSR approaches argue that corporations should do both: maximize private 
profit and do good for society. These two goals remain however unrelated: The 
profit goal and the goal to contribute to the common good are regarded as two 
separate aims of the corporation. Doing good for society is addressed as an 
additional goal beyond the goal primary goal of profit maximization. This means 
that dualist approaches do not consider interrelations between the process of 
maximizing profit and the common good. The concept of philanthropy best 
exemplifies this approach. 19th century industrialist and philanthropist Andrew 
Carnegie in a paper known as The Gospel of Wealth (1889) argued, that capitalist 
accumulation has brought about great wealth and progress alongside great inequality: ǲWe accept and welcome, therefore, as conditions to which we must 
accommodate ourselves, great inequality of environment, the concentration of 
business, industrial and commercial, in the hands of a few, and the law of 
competition between these, as being not only beneficial, but essential for the future progress of the raceǳ ȋCarnegie ͳͺͺͻ, ͸ͷͷȌ.  
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Based on this observation Carnegie concludes that instead of changing the social 
relations that bring about inequality, the wealthy should use their wealth in the 
best interest of society: Carnegie argued that it is the ǲduty of the man of Wealthǳ 
to use his wealth leading a modest life, to provide for those dependent on him, and 
use all further income for the benefit of the community (Carnegie 1889, 661f). 
According to Carnegie the solution to ǲthe problem of the Rich and the Poorǳ is that ǲthe millionaire will be but a trustee for the poor; intrusted for a season with a 
great part of the increased wealth of the community, but administering it for the 
community far better than it could or would have done for itselfǳ ȋCarnegie ͳͺͺͻ, 
664).  Carnegieǯs perception is still present in the views of contemporary philanthropists. 
George Soros for example stressed: "When I had made more money than I needed 
for myself and my family, I set up a foundation to promote the values and 
principles of a free and open society"2. Philanthropy is based on the idea to 
generate profit first and then devote parts of it to promoting the common good. 
This perspective accepts that the way profit is generated might have negative 
                                                        
2 GeorgeSoros.com. Philantropy FAQs. Retrieved from   
 http://georgesoros.com/faqs/entry/georgesorosphilanthropyisunprecedented/ 
on August 4, 2012. 
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effects on the common good, as long as parts of the profit are afterwards used to 
do good. 
Bill Gates addressed this dualism in the first talk he gave about the work of the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation. He said that one might find the ǲidea of mixing the mentality of making money and giving money [...] schizophrenicǲ. Gates continued 
with stressing that in order not to mess up both its important to keep making profit and doing good separate from each other: ǲ) admit, you've got to be careful 
not to bring one approach to one thing. If you mix them up you'll going to get it all messed up so ) try to keep those two things separateǳ ȋGates ʹͲͲͲȌ. Separating 
between generating profits and contributing to the common good leads to a 
strategy of taking with the one hand while giving with the other hand. 
The main characteristic of dualist approaches to CSR is that they postpone the 
socially responsible behaviour to a point after profit goals have already been 
reached. How these profit goals are reached and whether reaching them has negative affects on society or the environment is secondary. Žižek ȋʹͲͲ͸Ȍ described this reasoning as the ethics of ǲLiberal Communistsǳ - the CEOs of Google, )BM, eBay etc: ǲAccording to liberal communist ethics, the ruthless pursuit 
of profit is counteracted by charity: charity is part of the game, a humanitarian mask hiding the underlying economic exploitationǳ ȋŽižek ʹͲͲ͸Ȍ. )n ǲhiding the underlying exploitationǳ charity and philanthropic giving portray the wealthy as 
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generous benefactors while hiding how the creation of their fortune might have meant other peopleǯs misery. Dualist approaches are based on the logic of giving 
back with one hand what had been before been taken with the other hand. 
 
2.4. Dialectics – Problematizing the relation between the corporate and the 
social 
Dialectical approaches to CSR problematize the relation between economic goals of 
the corporation and its social responsibilities. Based on a critical analysis of 
capitalism they argue that profit generation inherently creates social and 
environmental problems. From this perspective the structural irresponsibility of 
profit generation can neither be resolved through turning social problems into 
business opportunities (reductionist CSR) or through imposing ethical norms or a 
social consciousness on profit generation (projectionist CSR), nor be balanced 
through charitable giving (dualist CSR approaches). According to this view a more 
fundamental societal alternative is inevitable in order to create a socially 
responsible economy and society.  The insight, that profit goals conflict with social goals is based on Karl Marxǯs 
critique of the political economy of capitalism. Marx described capitalism as a 
system that is based on the division between owners and non-owners of means of 
production, whereby those who posses means of production exploit the labour 
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power of those without property in order to accumulate profit (Marx 1867/1990). 
This relation of capital and labour lays the foundation for fundamental injustice: ǲPolitical economy starts from labour as the real soul of production; yet to labour it gives nothing, and to private property everythingǳ ȋMarx ͳͺͶͶ/ʹͲͲ͹, ͺͳȌ.  
A defining feature of capitalism is its constant drive for accumulation, which Marx 
described in the general formula of capital M-C-Mǯ ȋmoney–commodity–money 
plus surplus). What is crucial is that the production of surplus that later is turned 
into capital depends on the value creating qualities of human labour power (Marx 
1867/1990, 270). Thus, all accumulation of capital is based on the exploitation of 
labour power. Increasing accumulation therefore also means to increase exploitation. According to Marx the driving force of capitalist production is ǲthe 
greatest possible production of surplus-value, hence the greatest possible exploitation of labour power by the capitalistǳ ȋMarx ͳͺ͸͹/ͳͻͻͲ, ͶͻͻȌ. Capitalǯs 
desire to accumulate thus can only be satisfied at the cost of workers. Increasing 
surplus value is either possible through extending the total time of work, which 
means an absolute prolongation of surplus-labour time (absolute surplus-value), 
or through increasing intensity and productivity of labour so that more value can 
be produced during the same time (relative surplus-value) (Marx 1867/1990, 
645). As the only way to increase the accumulation of capital consists in increasing 
the rate of exploitation, the relationship between capital and labour can be 
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described as fundamentally antagonistic: the more capital is accumulated the more 
labour-power is exploited. 
While the relation between capital and labour is based on exploitation, the relation 
between capitalists is structured through competition. Competition forces the 
individual capitalist, by threat of loosing his/her business, to join the continuous 
pursuit of increasing profits and accumulating capital. Marx therefore described competition as an coercive force external to the individual capitalist: ǲBut looking 
at the things as a whole it is evident that this does not depend on the will, either 
good or bad, of the individual capitalist. Under free competition, the immanent 
laws of capitalist production confront the individual capitalist as a coercive force external to himǳ ȋMarx ͳͺ͸͹/ͳͻͻͲ, ʹͺ͸Ȍ.  Based on Marxǯs analysis contemporary political economists point out that due to 
its competitive character, exploitation and accumulation are necessary qualities of 
capitalism (Callinicos 2003, 36; Harvey 2010, 43; Holloway 2003, 231): For 
avoiding to lose in the competition every corporation is forced to follow the logic 
of increasing productivity and reducing production cost in order to sustain high 
level profits that can partly be reinvested in order to ensure further accumulation. 
Capitalist competition would make it almost impossible for the individual corporation to resist the logic of exploitation: ǲA benevolent capitalist who paid his 
workers wages that broadly correspond to the amount of value that they created 
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would soon find himself out of businessǳ ȋCallinicos ʹͲͲ͵, ͵͹Ȍ. Similarly David (arvey ȋʹͲͳͲȌ argues: ǲ)f ), as a capitalist, do not reinvest in expansion and a rival 
does, then after a while I am likely to be driven out of business. I need to protect and expand my market share. ) have to reinvest to stay a capitalistǳ ȋ(arvey 2010, 
43).  
Trapped within the forces of competition individual corporations engage in 
socially irresponsible practices that create problems in all domains of social life. Callinicos for example stresses: ǲThe major problems facing humankind – poverty, 
social injustices, economic instability, environmental destruction, and war – have 
the same source, in the capitalist system: the solution to these problems must, accordingly, be a radical oneǳ ȋCallinicos ʹͲͲ͵, ͸͸Ȍ. Saad-Filho (2003) argues that 
some contemporary problems of capitalism such as a lack of corporate 
responsibility and absolute poverty can be solved from within the system, while 
others are rooted in the way capitalism operates as an economic system (Saad-
Filho 2003, 21). Among the latter problems are ǲunemployment, exploitation of the 
workforce, economic inequality, the encroachment of work upon free time, 
systematic environmental degradation, the lack of economic democracy, and production for profit rather than needǳ ȋSaad-Filho 2003, 21). Wright in his book ǲEnvisioning Real Utopiasǳ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ shows in great detail that a number of 
contemporary problems are structural problems of capitalism, generated by 
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ǲcapitalism as a system of production with class relations defined by private 
ownership and propertyless workers, and economic coordination organized through decentralized market exchangesǳ ȋWright ʹͲͳͲ, ͵ͺȌ.  
Capitalist economies, despite CSR, cannot overcome social injustice as matters of 
distribution and participation are necessarily shaped by questions of class (Marx 
1844/2007, 81).  
Form a dialectical perspectives CSR approaches that do not critically questions the 
profit motive are ideological, because they hide how it inherently creates social 
and environmental problems. According to this view a fundamental shortcoming of 
the concept of CSR is that it never challenges the primacy of profit and the interests of capital ȋSklair and Miller ʹͲͳͲ, Ͷ͹ͷȌ. CSR has thus been described as ǲa 
deliberate strategy to mystify and obscure the reality of capitalist globalizationǳ ȋSklair and Miller ʹͲͳͲ, ͶͻʹȌ, that it functions ǲan ideological Ǯsmoke screenǯ 
designed to either soften the image of firms engrossed in the rampant pursuit of 
profit (at any cost) or a way to deflect attention away from an unsavoury core business modelǲ ȋ(anlon and Fleming ʹͲͲͻ, ͻ͵ͺȌ. Similarly Shamir highlights that ǲcorporations transform the idea of social responsibility into a marketing device 
and into a commodity that conceals the power relations that underlie the 
relationship between global capitalism and social inequality, social harm, and social wrongsǲ ȋShamir ʹͲͲͶ, ͸ͺͶȌ. In this context Banerjee stresses that the 
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discourse on sustainability has been ǲhijacked by corporate interestsǳ ȋBanerjee 
2008, 64). Fleming and Jones (2013, 94) point out that apart from being propaganda CSR furthermore is a ǲparasitical instrument of commodificationǳ. 
The same points of criticism have been raised regarding business ethics in general. Roberts fears ǲthat all this talk of ethics is just that – talkǲ ȋRoberts ʹͲͲ͵, ʹͷͲȌ; 
Boje stresses that it ǲserves as a shield to hide unethical practiceǳ ȋBoje ʹͲͲͺ, ͺȌ, that it forms ǲideologies imposed upon the oppressedǳ ȋBoje ʹͲͲͺ, ͳͻȌ, and constitutes ǲideological masks to cover up dirty business and market forces with ethics plaquesǳ ȋBoje ʹͲͲͺ, ͳͻȌ. Roberts in this context talks of an ǳethics of narcissusǲ, which means that CSR is used for creating an image of  ǳcorporate goodnessǳ, while ǲoperational practices remain entirely untouchedǳ ȋRoberts 
20Ͳ͵, ʹͷ͹Ȍ and thus constitutes a ǲcorporate response serve only to facilitate Ǯbusiness as usualǯǳ ȋRoberts ʹͲͲ͵, ʹͷ͹Ȍ.  
Taking into consideration this integration of CSR in profit-maximizing pursuit of 
business, it has been criticised as being part of the problem instead of the solution 
to social and environmental problems (Sklair and Miller 2010, 483). Sklair and Miller for example stress that CSR ǲcan be seen as a set of globalizing practices 
carried out by the four fractions of the TCC [Transnational Capitalist Class] in the interest of capitalist globalizationǳ ȋSklair and Miller ʹͲͳͲ, ͶͺͶȌ. Regarding CSR, 
Roberts stresses that ǲthe prime beneficiary of this manufacture of appearance is 
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the corporation itselfǲ ȋRoberts ʹͲͲ͵, ʹͷ͹Ȍ. Similarly Hanlon emphasizes that ǲCSR 
will help to make money from the problems businesses have helped to create, thereby improving shareholder valueǳ ȋ(anlon ʹͲͲͺ, ͳ͸ͻȌ. Fleming and Jones stress that ǲCSR must be viewed as an obstruction to genuine progressive change 
rather than its harbingerǳ ȋFleming and Jones ʹͲͳ͵, ͸Ȍ. According to these 
criticisms, CSR functions as a strategy of resistance against all solutions to these 
problems that might negatively affect corporate profit interests. 
Dialectical approaches to CSR thus highlight the necessity of a fundamental 
critique of the profit motive and capitalism: Corlett for example takes a dialectical perspective when arguing that ǲfundamental moral problems with capitalismǳ exist ȋCorlett ͳͻͻͺ, ͳͲ͵Ȍ. (e highlights: ǲ)n other words, the private ownership of 
the means of production is morally wrong because it enables capitalists to extract value from what workers alone produceǳ ȋCorlett ͳͻͻͺ, ͳͲʹȌ. Boje stresses that ǲ)t 
is not enough to try to be good and ethical as individuals when it is the systemic processes that must be dealt withǳ ȋBoje ʹͲͲͺ, ʹʹȌ. Showing how corporate 
practices systematically undermine social responsibility is thus an important task 
for critical CSR research. This needs to include both the theoretical reflection about 
capitalism and the role of the corporation, as well as concrete empirical examples 
that expose corporate social irresponsibility.  
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Apart from exposing corporate social irresponsibility, critical CSR research needs 
to identify alternative pathways that seem more promising for realizing a socially responsible economy. Banerjee stresses that for critically approaching CSR ǲnew 
questions need to be raised not only about the ecological and social sustainability but of the political economy itselfǳ ȋBanerjee 2008, 73). 
Thus far, critics remain rather unclear in regard to the question what possible 
alternatives to CSR could look like. Critical CSR research gives a pessimistic 
outlook regarding the potentials of reconciling profit goals and social 
responsibility.  Fleming and Jones for example stress: ǲCSR scholarship needs to abandon the idea that business and ethics might someday be marriedǳ ȋFleming 
and Jones 2013, 99). However, a lack clarity regarding the conclusion that needs to 
be drawn from this analysis is one shortcoming of most critical CSR research.  
It seems evident that rethinking political economy in a way that resolves the 
contradiction between profit and social responsibility requires thinking towards a 
fundamental social alternative. In the following section I propose a counter-
concept to CSR that looks beyond capitalism. 
 
3. Transcending the corporate: From CSR to RSC 
The mainstream debate on CSR (reductionist, projectionist, and dualist 
approaches) suggests that social and environmental problems of contemporary 
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society can be entirely resolved without calling into question the structural 
foundations of the present capitalist system. If all problems that contemporary 
society is facing are solvable within capitalism, looking beyond it becomes 
obsolete. By taking for granted the existence of capitalist social relations, CSR 
contributes to the naturalization of capitalism and makes it appear fixed and unchangeable. )n its present form CSR strengthens capitalist hegemony: ǳ)n 
contemporary global capitalism, ideological naturalization has reached an 
unprecedented level; rare are those who dare even to dream utopian dreams about possible alternativesǲ ȋŽižek ʹͲͲͻ, ͹͹Ȍ. A debate about CSR that does not think 
beyond capitalism forestalls the question whether an alternative way of organizing 
the economy might be more compatible with social and environmental 
sustainability. A counter discourse about CSR thus needs to transcend this 
ideological naturalization through conducting and further advancing a dialectical 
critique of CSR.  
The discussion in section 2 shows that the dominant discourse on CSR naturalizes 
capitalism, hides irresponsible business practices, legitimizes corporations and 
neoliberal deregulation and depoliticises the quest for a responsible economy. It 
thus rather strengthens corporate power than subverting it.  
However, during the past decade social movements and corporate watchdogs have 
increasingly put corporations under pressure by exposing corporate wrongdoings. 
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Many companies feel obliged to justify their activities and publish CSR reports. 
Describing profit maximization as the only corporate goal no longer seems 
legitimate. CSR is an ideology. But even ideologies entail, as Marx argued, a rational element: ǲReason has always existed but not always in rational form. The critic, 
therefore, can start with any form of theoretical and practical consciousness and 
develop the true actuality out of the forms inherent in existing actuality as its 
ought-to-be and goalǳ ȋMarx ͳͺͶ͵/ͳͻͻ͹, ͻͷȌ. CSR reflects the desire to make profit 
compatible with the common good, to make profit more social. However, the way 
CSR is understood and practiced today does not contribute to this goal. CSR 
proposes to make profit social through either extending its reach (reductionism), 
taming it through imposing values upon it (projectionism), or balancing it through 
supporting social projects (dualism). Rather than identifying the constant drive for 
profit maximization as a major cause of existing social and environmental 
problems, the dominant CSR discourse uses the social desire for a socially 
responsible economy for creating new markets for supposedly ethical and 
responsible products.  
In order to realize the rational element entailed in CSR, it is necessary to go beyond 
CSR. For that purpose one can employ a technique that Marx suggested for discovering the ǲrational kernelǳ in (egelǯs idealist understanding of dialectics. Marx argued that (egelǯs dialectics ǲis standing on its head. )t must be inverted, in 
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order to discover the rational kernel within the mystical shellǳ ȋMarx ͳͺ͸͹/ͳͻͻͲ, ͳͲ͵Ȍ. The same holds true for CSR. )n order to discover its ǲrational kernelǳ within the ǲmystical shellǳ, CSR must be turned from its head to its feet - turned from its 
head to its feet, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) turns into the Responsibility 
to Socialize Corporations (RSC). 
RSC is the logical continuation of a dialectical perspective on CSR that considers 
conflicts between the profit motive and social responsibility: in order to become 
truly social, capitalist corporations need to be socialized, so that private wealth 
turns into common wealth. Private profit is based on the principle of feeding on the 
common resources of society (labour power, natural resources, knowledge 
resources etc) and turning them into private property. Generating profit thus 
means that private wealth is maximized at the cost of general social wellbeing. The 
sublation of the antagonisms between profit and social responsibility requires an 
alternative economy and society in which economic and social goals are not longer 
opposed, but coincide with each other. Thus, only if the creation of economic 
wealth no longer takes on the form of private profit, that is only if general 
economic wealth supersedes private profit, the conflict between economic goals 
and social responsibility can be resolved. This requires the socialisation of the 
societal logic from private property to common property, from elitist decision-
making to participatory decision-making and from particularist values to universal 
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values.  
RSC points towards visions of societal alternatives that are based on democratic 
ownership of the means of production and a participatory organization of politics.  
At the level of individual corporations, establishing worker owned cooperatives is 
a means for realizing RSC. At the macro level this corresponds to a fundamental 
social alternative as it has recently been described by Hardt and Negri (2009), Douzinas and Žižek ȋʹͲͳͲȌ, Wright ȋʹͲͳͲȌ, J.K. Gibson-Graham et al. (2013) or Wolff ȋʹͲͳʹȌ. (ardt and Negri ȋʹͲͲͻȌ use the notion of ǲCommonwealthǳ for expressing ǲthe need to institute and manage a world of common wealth, focussing 
on and expanding our capacities for collective production and self-governmentǳ ȋ(ardt and Negri ʹͲͲͻ, xiiiȌ. For Douzinas and Žižek ȋʹͲͳͲȌ communism constitutes a new commonwealth: ǲCommunism, by returning to the concept of the Ǯcommonǯ, confronts capitalist privatization with a view to building a new commonwealthǲ ȋDouzinas and Žižek ʹͲͳͲ, ixȌ. Eric Olin Wright ȋʹͲͳͲȌ argues for 
socialism as a way of democratizing the economy as well as the state (Wright 2010, 
145).  Similarly Callinicos highlights the importance of envisioning an alternative to capitalism that meets the ǲrequirements of ȋat leastȌ justice, efficiency, democracy, and sustainabilityǳ ȋCallinicos ʹͲͲ͵, ͳͲ͹Ȍ. Wolff suggests establishing 
radically democratic workersǯ self-directed enterprises and democratic community 
organizations in order to create a more just and responsible economy. In such an 
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economy ǲSocial criteria – democratically determined by self-directed workers and 
community members – would replace the drive for profit and accumulation in investment and all other economic decisionsǳ ȋWolff ʹͲͳʹ, ͳͶȌ.  
 J.K. Gibson-Graham, Jenny Cameron and Stephen Healy (2013, xviii) envision a ǲcommunity economyǳ as a way of ǲtaking back the economy through ethical actionǳ. This would require going beyond capitalist corporations and markets by 
radically reconfiguring work, the distribution of surplus, social relationships, 
sustainability, consumption the engagement with natural and cultural commons 
(Gibson-Graham, Cameron and Healy 2013, xviiif) 
Establishing a discourse about RSC provides an opportunity to break through the 
ideological naturalization of capitalism and to turn the task of establishing a 
socially responsible economy and society from a managerial into a broader social 
and political question. I will now conclude with some remarks on how to foster the 
realization of RSC.  
 
 
4. Conclusion: Radical reformism as strategy for social transformation  
In this paper I presented four ways of relating social and economic goals of the 
corporation: reductionist approaches instrumentalize social responsibility in order 
to achieve profit goals; projectionist approaches highlight that profit should be 
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generated in a socially responsible way; dualist approaches stress that social and 
economic goals can be achieved simultaneously without considering interrelations 
between them; dialectical approaches describe the relation between economic and 
social goals of the corporation as antagonistic (section 2).  In section 3 I argued 
that the concept of CSR contains the desire for an economy that is socially 
responsible but fails to realize it. In order to overcome the antagonism between 
the corporate and the social I suggested turning Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) from its head to its feet into the Responsibility to Socialize Corporations 
(RSC). Whereas CSR entail idealist hopes about reconciling corporate and social 
goals within capitalism, RSC highlights that material transformations are necessary 
to achieve a truly socially responsible and socially just economy. 
Gibson-Graham, Cameron and (ealy ȋʹͲͳ͵, ͺȌ highlight the importance of ǲseeing 
the economy not as a machine but as the day-to-day processǳ that is created and 
can be changed by our actions. They therefore stress the need for radically 
rethinking and reframing the economy in a way that allows all members of society 
to survive well and equitably, that enables a just distribution of surplus for 
enriching social and environmental health, that allows building direct and 
nurturing relationships with others, that fosters sustainable consumption, that 
protects and enriches the natural and cultural commons and that invests in 
sustainable forms of living (Gibson-Graham, Cameron and Healy 2013). 
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RSC rejects the naturalisation of capitalism and, as Gibson-Graham et al suggest, 
regards the economy as changeable and as ǲa space of ethical decision makingǳ 
(Gibson-Graham, Cameron and Healy 2013, 190). 
That in principle the quest for RSC as a means for making the economy truly social 
refers to a fundamental transformation of the economy and society does not mean 
that it is impossible to improve the existing system. The idea of social 
responsibility can thus inspire a vision of an alternative society as well as support 
reforms that make the existing society more socially responsible. Worker owned, 
controlled, and managed cooperatives for example anticipate the idea of RSC at the 
level of individual organizations. Richard Wolff (2012) highlights that the expansion of workersǯ self-directed enterprises could increase democratic decision 
power over the economy, realise a more just distribution of surplus and confront 
alienation. Wright argues that ǲemancipatory transformation should not be viewed mainly as 
a binary shift from one system to another, but rather as a shift in the configuration of the power relationsǳ ȋWright ʹͲͳͲ, ʹ͸͹Ȍ. Such a perspective that envisions 
radical transformations while at the same time insisting in the need for and 
possibility of immediate improvements is based on a dialectics of reform and 
revolution. It advocates a gradual transformation through reforms that increase 
social empowerment over the state and the economy and thus at the same time 
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increase the conditions for a more radical social transformation. Radical reforms 
thus want to achieve immediate improvements and social empowerment and 
through these improvements also open up spaces for advancing the long-term goal 
of a social alternative. Radical reformism can thereby employ social movement 
activism as well as party politics. Adding a revolutionary perspective could expand 
the prospects of both anarchist counter-projects and social democratic reformism 
and create synergy effects between them. It would allow adding an expansive 
element to anarchist projects, in such a way that they are not only regarded as 
small-scale counter-projects but as expanding social alternatives. At the same time 
party politics and political reforms that do not confine themselves to immanent 
improvements, but take a transcendent perspective, could help to improve the 
objective conditions for such an expansion of alternative projects. In order to 
broaden the political support for such a project alliances with the Keynesian 
stream of projectionist CSR might be fruitful. Most importantly, RSC is a reminder 
of the possibility of socially responsible economic alternatives beyond capitalism, 
which realize collective decision power and satisfy social needs rather than 
individualized profit goals.   
Radical reforms for example include reforms that: 
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• strengthen democracy (e.g. through public funding of civil society groups and 
social movements, through more direct forms of political decision making, through 
freely accessible political education, etc.); • democratize the workplace (e.g. through guaranteeing workers the right to 
participate in corporate decision making process including decisions about wages 
and working hours and to support worker unions and worker owned 
cooperatives); • reduce poverty and socio-economic inequality (e.g. through the redistribution of 
wealth through fiscal policies, a just distribution of surplus, the introduction of a 
guaranteed basic income, worldwide legal minimum wages, worldwide laws 
against child-labour, the reduction of the working week, anti-discrimination laws, 
abolition of laws that restrict migration, the full cancellation of third world debts, 
public provision of health care, pensions, education, infrastructure including 
access to media, information and communication technologies and the Internet); • restrict corporate power (e.g. through economic regulations, control of capital 
flows, nationalization of the banking system, public funding of civil society 
watchdog organizations and alternative media that report about corporate crimes 
and wrongdoings around the world, etc.); and • strengthen those tendencies that entail the potential of going beyond capitalism 
and contradict the capitalist private property logic and are based on the idea of the 
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common (e.g. through the abolition of intellectual property rights and the support 
of initiatives that strengthen the common such as the open source movement, file- 
sharing, or Wikipedia). 
Such a radical reformism that combines social movement activism, bottom-up 
alternative projects and structural reforms could help to realize RSC, the 
responsibility to socialize corporations, and thereby create a socially responsible 
society based on the radically democratic organization of the economy and politics 
as an alternative to capitalism. This however is a long-term, indetermined political 
process that is subject to social struggles. 
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